laquelle les types sont des ensembles ordinaires. Cette formulation est obtenue en rempla cant le -calcul par un langage de combinateurs (sch emas de compr ehension skol emis e), en introduisant une distinction entre les propositions et leurs contenus, en relativisant les quanti cateurs et en n en rempla cant les pr edicats de typage par l'appartenance a des ensembles. La th eorie ainsi obtenue pr esente a la fois des aspects de th eorie des types et des aspects de th eorie des ensembles. Comme la th eorie des ensembles, c'est une th eorie du premier ordre et elle repose sur une unique notion de collection. Comme la th eorie des types, elle fournit une notation explicite pour les objets, une notion primitive de fonction et les propositions sont des objets.
Introduction
A set is a collection of objects de ned by a characteristic property of its elements, for instance \the set of natural numbers lower than or equal to 3". At a rst glance, a type is also a collection of objects de ned by a characteristic property of its elements, for instance \the type of natural numbers". A di erence between the notions of set and type lies in the fact that a given object usually belongs to only one type while it may belong to several sets. For instance, the type of 0 is nat (the type of natural numbers) while 0 belongs to several sets fx j x 3g, fx j x = 0g, fx j 9y x = 2 yg, etc. Also the fact that a given object belongs to a type is often a decidable judgement, while the fact that a given object belongs to a set is usually not. At last, the type of an expression restricts its use. For instance, as 0 has type nat and true has type bool, the proposition 0 0 is well-formed and the proposition true true is not.
Thus a postulate underlying the use of (simply) typed languages is that among all the properties veri ed by an object, a single one, its type, determines the uses of this object. In many situations this postulate seems to be too restrictive. For instance, the expression p a is de ned when a is a positive real number and 1=a is de ned when a is non zero complex number. Thus more liberal type disciplines have been designed (overloading, polymorphism, subtyping, etc.) For instance, we may consider the types complex, real, non-zero and positive, non-zero and real being subtypes of complex and positive being a subtype of real. When such extensions are considered, unicity of type is lost and decidability sometimes also. Moreover there seems to be very few di erences between the judgement \1 belongs to the type positive" and the proposition \1 2 R + ". There is a conceptual di culty to explain why type and set are two distinct notions and it seems that types should be mere sets. This advocates for founding mathematics on a theory with a single notion of collection, such as set theory, rather than one with two distinct notions, such as type theory.
Another reason advocating for set theory are that it is a rst order theory while type theory is not. At last, for abstract mathematics set theory is better suited than type theory. If we develop, for instance, results about groups in type theory, we cannot apply these results both to the group of integers and to the group of bijective functions mapping integers to integers, because when we develop these results, we need to give a xed type to the elements of the group. This problem is usually solved by using \typical ambiguity" i.e. more or less type variables.
However, in some situations, type theory is better suited than set theory. For instance, proofs-as-objects interpretations are always developed in typed languages 8, 34, 21, 22, 12] . Also when one is interested in expressing computations as rewrite rules on the expressions of the language, type theories seem better suited than set theories 34, 21, 22, 12] . At last automated theorem proving methods have been developed for type theory 3, 28, 29] and very rarely for set theory.
Several reasons explain these success of type theory. (1) Type theory provides an explicit notation for objects ( -calculus) while set theory merely provides axioms expressing the existence of some objects. (2) Functions are primitive objects in type theory and the object obtained by applying a function to some object has a notation, while it has not in set theory as functions are coded as relations. (3) Meaningless statements such as 1 2 0 are forbidden by the syntax of type theory but not by the one of set theory. (4) Typing judgements are decidable in type theory (this fact is used in the functional interpretation of proofs, as proofs judgements must be decidable). (5) Propositions are objects in type theory and not in set theory (with the exception of Morse's set theory 39]).
We give in this paper a rst order formulation of Church's theory of types where types are mere sets. This theory is obtained by rst considering a formulation with combinators (skolemized comprehension schemes) instead of -calculus 14], introducing a distinction between propositions and their contents, relativizing quanti ers as in 20, 15, 42] and at last replacing the typing predicates by belongness to some sets.
The theory obtained this way has both a type theoretical and a set theoretical avor. Like set theory, there is only one notion of collection, the theory is expressed in a rst order setting and typical ambiguity is not required. Like type theory, it provides an explicit notation for objects, functions are primitive objects and propositions are objects. The decidability of typing judgements can be seen as the decidability of a fragment of the language. The formation of meaningless propositions is not yet forbidden as this requirement is incompatible with the expression in a rst order setting, we suggest at the end of the paper an extension of rst order logic that would allow to forbid the formation of these propositions.
This formulation permits to simplify the proofs of Henkin's completeness theorem and of a variant of Miller's higher order skolemization theorem.
1 Typed rst order logic
Syntax
De nition A typed rst order language (see 20] for a detailed presentation) is given by a denumerable collection T of types, for each type T of T , a denumerably in nite collection V T of variables, such that if T 6 = U then V T and V U are disjoint, a denumerable collection of function symbols, to each function symbol f is associated an element of T n+1 (n 0) called its rank, a denumerable collection of predicate symbols, to each predicate symbol P is associated an element of T n (n 0) called its rank.
De nition Terms of type T are inductively de ned as variables of V T are terms of type T, if f is a function symbol of rank (T 1 ; :::; T n ; T n+1 ) and t 1 , ..., t n are terms of type T 1 ; :::; T n then (f t 1 ::: t n ) is a term of type T n+1 .
De nition Propositions is inductively de ned as if P is a predicate symbol of rank (T 1 ; :::; T n ) and t 1 
Proofs
Proof rules for typed rst order logic are the same as the ones for rst order logic, with an extra side condition for quanti ers rules, that a variable of type T can only be substituted by a term of type T. Natural deduction, sequent calculus and Frege-Hilbert systems can be used. We give below a formulation of natural deduction. As usual substitution is de ned in such a way that variable captures are avoided.
De nition (Substitution) x 
Models
De nition A model M for typed rst order logic based on a collection T of types is given by a family (M T ) T 2T of non empty sets, for each function symbol f of type (T 1 ; :::; T n ; T n+1 ) a functionf from M T1 ::: M Tn to M Tn+1 , for each predicate symbol P of type (T 1 ; :::; T n ) a subsetP of M T1 ::: M Tn .
De nition Let M be a model, an assignment onto M is function ' associating to each variable x of V T an element of M T . If ' is an assignment, x a variable of V T and a an element of M T , we write ' + (x; a) for the assignment such that (y) = a if y = x and (y) = '(y) otherwise.
De nition Let M be a model and ' an assignment, we de ne a function ' that associates to each term of type T an element of M T and to each proposition an element of f0; 1g.
'(x) = '(x), '(f t 1 ::: t n ) =f('(t 1 ); :::; '(t n )), '(P t 1 ::: t n ) = 1 if ('(t 1 ); :::; '(t n )) is inP and 0 otherwise, '(>) = In a rst order language, individual symbols denote elements of the domain, predicate symbols denote sets of elements of the domain and function symbols denote functions over the domain.
More expressions denoting elements of the domain can be built as terms. Facts concerning all the elements of the domain or some unspeci ed elements of the domain can be expressed using variables and quanti ers. But, it is impossible to construct expressions denoting more sets of elements of the domain, or more functions over the domain than the ones given as primitive symbols. It is also impossible to express facts concerning all (or some unspeci ed) sets of elements of the domain or all (or some unspeci ed) functions over the domain. For instance, in rst order arithmetic we cannot express the proposition Every non empty set of natural numbers has a greatest lower bound Any rst order theory can be extended with sets and functions. A set is written fx 1 ; :::; x n j Pg where x 1 ; :::; x n are variables and P is a proposition, in the same way a function is written x 1 ; :::; x n 7 ! t where x 1 ; :::; x n are variables and t is a term. In this extension, variables may denote arbitrarily elements of the domain, sets of elements of the domain, functions over the domain, and also sets of sets, sets of functions, functions over sets, functions over functions, etc. Any term can be understood as denoting an individual, a set or a function of arbitrary arity, thus the notion of arity is lost, also is the distinction between individual symbols, function symbols and predicate symbols which are replaced by a single syntactical category of primitive symbols.
De nition Terms and propositions are inductively de ned as variables are terms, primitive symbols are terms, if f is a term and a 1 ; :::; a n are terms then (f a 1 ::: a n ) is a term. if P is a proposition and x 1 ; :::; x n are variables then fx 1 ; :::; x n j Pg is a term, if t is a term and x 1 ; :::; x n are variables then x 1 ; :::; x n 7 ! t is a term. If P is a term and a 1 ; :::; a n are terms then (P a 1 ::: a n ) is a proposition, > and ? are To the axioms already present in the the rst order theory, we add axioms expressing the replacement of formal arguments of a set or a function by the actual ones (conversion axioms) and axioms de ning the equality of two sets or two functions (extensionality axioms). We take the universal closure of the following propositions. Conversion: 8x 1 ::: 8x n (fx 1 ; :::; x n j Pg x 1 ::: x n ) , P 8x 1 ::: 8x n ((x 1 ; :::; x n 7 ! t) x 1 ::: x n ) = t Extensionality: 8f 8g (8x 1 ::: 8x n (f x 1 ::: x n ) = (g x 1 ::: x n )) ) f = g 8P 8Q (8x 1 ::: 8x n (P x 1 ::: x n ) , (Q x 1 ::: x n )) ) P = Q Deduction rules are the usual ones.
De nition Na ve set theory is the extension of the rst order theory of equality with functions and sets.
We do not take any kind of mathematical objects (numbers, etc.) as primitive as once we have sets and functions we can construct internally all the mathematical objects we need. Thus we take as axioms the universal closure of the following propositions. Conversion: 8x 1 ::: 8x n (fx 1 ; :::; x n j Pg x 1 ::: x n ) , P 8x 1 ::: 8x n ((x 1 ; :::; x n 7 ! t) x 1 ::: x n ) = t Extensionality: 8f 8g (8x 1 ::: 8x n (f x 1 ::: x n ) = (g x 1 ::: x n )) ) f = g 8P 8Q (8x 1 ::: 8x n (P x 1 ::: x n ) , (Q x 1 ::: x n )) ) P = Q Equality:
8x (x = x) 8a 8b (a = b) ) (P x a] ) P x b]) Inria 
The Comprehension schemes
In the presentation of a theory we can either choose to give notations for objects and axioms expressing the properties of these objects, or to give axioms expressing the existence of objects verifying the desired properties. For instance, relations with a maximal element can either be de ned by the language , M and the axiom 8x (x M) or by the language and the axiom 9y 8x (x y)
From the second formulation we can produce the rst by skolemizing the axioms (in this case we skolemize the external existential quanti er of the axiom).
In the same way instead of having an explicit notation for sets and functions, we can merely state axioms expressing their existence (comprehension schemes). We take as axioms the universal closure of the following propositions.
9A 8x 1 ::: 8x n ((A x 1 ::: x n ) , P) where A is not free in P, 9f 8x 1 ::: 8x n ((f x 1 ::: x n ) = t) where f is not free in t.
If we skolemize these axioms we get primitive symbols that roughly look like the terms x 1 ; :::; x n 7 ! t and fx 1 ; :::; x n j Pg. The comprehension schemes roughly become 8x 1 ::: 8x n ((fx 1 ; :::; x n j Pg x 1 ::: x n ) , P) 8x 1 ::: 8x n (((x 1 ; :::; x n 7 ! t) x 1 ::: x n ) = t) which are more or less the conversion axioms 6]. There are however some di erences between the theory obtained by skolemizing the comprehension schemes and the theory based on the full notation 7 !, f j g.
First, as abstractions are primitive symbols in the skolemized language, there is no substitution under abstractions. Then, when we skolemize the comprehension schemes, we get symbols x 1 ; :::; x n 7 ! t and fx 1 ; :::; x n j Pg only for terms t and propositions P that do not contain further abstractions, i.e. there is no nested abstractions. So the equivalence of the these two formulations is not a mere consequence of Skolem's theorem. For na ve set theory the equivalence of these formulations is trivial (since, as we shall see, both formulations are inconsistent). For set theory and type theory, studied below, the equivalence is proved in 14] (slight adaptation of the proof of 14] is needed for type theory as formulated below). Skolemizing the comprehension schemes gives a presentation of the theory with an explicit notation for objects, but this notation is closer to a language of combinators than to the full notation 7 !, f j g.
Flattening
In a rst order language, in a term of the form (f a 1 ::: a n ), f is a function symbol, thus this term can be de ned as a tree whose root is labeled by the symbol f and whose sons are a 1 ; :::; a n . In na ve set theory, we cannot look at the term (f a 1 ::: a n ) as a tree whose root is labeled by f, as f is also a term. So we de ne this term as a tree whose root is labeled by a symbol n and whose sons are f; a 1 ; :::; a n . Such a term is better written ( n f a 1 ::: a n ). In the same way, a proposition (P a 1 ::: a n ) is better written (2 n P a 1 ::: a n ).
This way, primitive symbols (i.e. individual symbols, function symbols and predicate symbols of the initial language) are individual symbols (i.e. zero-ary function symbols) in this new language, while the only (non zero-ary) function symbols and predicate symbols are n and 2 n . Remark With the comprehension schemes (or the skolmemized comprehension schemes) and the symbols n and 2 n , na ve set theory is formulated in a rst order language.
But this rst-order language is very di erent from the rst-order language we started with. If we started, for instance, with rst order arithmetic, the symbols 0, S and were respectively an individual symbol, a unary function symbol and a binary predicate symbol. They are now all individual symbols. In rst order arithmetics, the domain of the language contains only natural numbers, now it contains all together natural numbers, sets, functions, functions of functions, etc. There are two ways to extend a rst order theory. Either we keep the same universe of the discourse and we extend the logic to speak about sets of elements of this universe and functions over this universe, or we extend the universe of the discourse including sets and functions and we keep the same logic. Flattening permits to shift from the rst choice to the second.
Currying
Instead of having a notion of function of n variables, we can have only functions of one variable and de ne a function of n variables f as a function mapping an object a to the function of n ? 1 variables x 2 ; :::; x n 7 ! (f a x 2 ::: x n ).
The term ( n f a 1 ::: a n ) is now written ( 1 ::: ( 1 f a 1 ) ::: a n ) and if we have the notation 7 !, the term x 1 ; :::; x n 7 ! t is written x 1 7 ! (::: x n 7 ! t). (The language obtained this way is called -calculus.) In the same way a predicate (set) of n variables can be de ned as a function mapping an object a to the predicate of n ? 1 variables fx 2 ; :::; x n j (P a x 2 ::: x n )g. The proposition (2 n A a 1 ::: a n ) is now written 2 0 ( 1 ::: ( 1 A a 1 ) ::: a n ) and if we have the notation f j g, the term fx 1 ; :::; x n j Pg is then written x 1 7 ! ::: 7 ! x n 7 ! fPg. Notice that P is a proposition and fPg is a term. The object fPg is the content (lexis) of the proposition P. In contrast, when we consider the comprehension schemes or the skolemized comprehension schemes, we cannot restrict ourselves to unary schemes that are strictly weaker than the n-ary ones 14] .
Let us write for 1 and " for 2 0 . The axioms are then rephrased as the universal closure of the following propositions. Comprehension:
9A 8x 1 ::: 8x n ((" ( ::: ( A x 1 ) ::: x n )) , P) where A is not free in P, 9f 8x 1 ::: 8x n (( ::: ( f x 1 ) ::: x n ) = t) where f is not free in t.
Extensionality:
Remark We could go one step further and identify the proposition (" a) with the term a and the term fPg with the proposition P.
Russell's paradox
Na ve set theory is inconsistent as we can derive the proposition (" (fx j:(x x)gfx j:(x x)g)) , :(" (fx j:(x x)gfx j:(x x)g)) and thus the proposition ?.
Inria
The mechanisms of na ve set theory can be presented as follows propositions abstraction #" application objects The abstraction mechanism permits to form objects from propositions (for instance, from the proposition x 3, we form the object fx j x 3g), and the application mechanism permit to form propositions using objects (for instance, from fx j x 3g and 2, we form (" ( fx j x 3g 2))). Thus to weaken na ve set theory and make it consistent, one can either weaken the downarrow (and get set theory) or weaken the uparrow (and get type theory).
Set theory
In set theory we consider only sets and sets have only one argument. The proposition (2 1 P a) is written a 2 P. Equality is a predicate symbol (not a primitive symbol), thus there are no primitive symbols. The The comprehension scheme 9X 8a (a 2 X , P) is still powerful enough to express Russell's paradox, so we restrict it to four instances: the subset scheme (or restricted comprehension), the power set axiom, the union axiom and the pairing axiom. We keep the extensionality and equality axioms.
De nition The axioms of set theory are the universal closure of the following propositions.
Subset:
Equality:
Remark Set theory is a rst order theory. Remark These axioms are Zermelo's axioms, they can be extended to Zermelo-Fraenkel by adding the replacement scheme. Other extensions are the Von Neuman-G odel-Bernays set theory and Morse's set theory.
Type Theory
The other way to weaken na ve set theory is to weaken the rule that permits to form the term ( a b) whatever the terms a and b are. Thus we add types to na ve set theory and get a typed rst order theory. De nition A higher order language is a typed rst order language based on this set of types and containing function symbols T;U of rank (T ! U; T; U), a predicate symbol " of rank (o) and some individual symbols of rank (T ) for some type T. These individual symbols are called primitive symbols.
Thus De nition (Type theory) Type theory is a theory in the higher order language containing the primitive symbols = T of type T ! T ! o. The axioms are the universal closure of the following propositions. 8P 8Q ((" P) , (" Q)) ) (P = o Q) 8f 8g (8x ( T;U f x) = U ( T;U g x)) ) (f = T !U g) Equality: 8x (x = T x) 8a 8b (a = T b) ) ( Remark In the comprehension schemes, we can either consider that all the variables free in P (resp. t) are among x 1 ; :::; x n (closed schemes) or not (open schemes). In the second case, we take the universal closure of the instances of the schemes to have closed axioms. As shown in 14], these formulations are equivalent.
From now on, we consider only the instances of the schemes such that all the variables free in P (resp. t) are among x 1 ; :::; x n .
Remark The de nition of type theory comes in two steps. First we de ne the notion of higher order language that can be compared to the notion of rst order language. Then we de ne type theory that is a set of axioms expressed in a higher order language and that one can compare to any rst order theory, such as arithmetic.
A higher order language permits to introduce set variables and function variables and to quantify over these variables. It does not assert which sets and which functions we are talking about. One could for instance consider a theory such that every function is constant. In type theory the comprehension schemes state the existence of some sets and functions. To have more sets and functions, the descriptions axioms or the axiom of choice are usually added to these axioms 6].
Remark (Avoiding axiom schemes)
In set theory comprehension schemes are indexed by propositions. In type theory, they are indexed by propositions (or terms), and also by types.
It is possible to avoid this indexing by propositions and terms. In set theory, this is done in the Von Neuman-G odel-Bernays set theory. In type theory, the situation is simpler because, for each type, the comprehension schemes are equivalent to a nite number of their instances. 9k 8x 8y (k x y) = x 9s 8x 8y 8z (s x y z) = (x z (y z)) Indeed the combinators K and S are su cient to express all the -terms and all the logical constants can be expressed from equality 25, 2] .
The simplicity of this expression (compared to set theory) is due to the fact that propositions are objects in type theory, while they are not in set theory.
Models of type theory and general models
A higher order language is a typed rst order language, with function symbols T;U , a predicate symbol " and individual symbols (primitive symbols). Thus, a model of a higher order language is given by a family M T of non empty sets, a family of functions A T;U from M T !U M T to M U , denotations of T;U , a subset Y of M o , denotation of ", for each primitive symbol of type T an element of M T , (for instance, for the language of type theory, an element E T of M T !T!o for every type T, denotation of = T ). Remark Let ? be a theory and C be the class of models of ?. We have ?`A if and only if A is valid in all the models of C. Subclasses C 0 of C may share this property with C. For instance, in rst order logic with equality, provable propositions are characterized either by the class of all models of the equality axioms, but also by the class of equality models i.e. models where equality denotes equality in the model. We exhibit now a class of models (the class of general models) that is smaller than the class of all models of type theory, but is still such that a proposition is derivable in type theory if and only if it is valid in every general model. In the following we study only equality models of the axioms of type theory.
Proposition Let 
Proposition Equality functional models are models of the extensionality axiom 8f 8g (8x ( f x) = ( g x)) ) (f = g) Proof Let M be a equality functional model, we want to show that M is a model of the extensionality . We prove by induction over term structure that for every term a we have '(a) = ('(a) ). Then we prove by induction over proposition structure that for every proposition, P we have '(P) = '(P). Thus Remark There are models of type theory that are not general models. First only equality models (and not all the models of the equality axioms) are general models. Then only functional models (and not all the models of the extensionality axiom) are general models.
Remark The rst condition (the model is an equality model) is forgotten in 24] and is added in 5]. This condition is important because if we do not take it, the other conditions do not imply the validity of the axioms. In particular, a non equality functional model need not be a model of the extensionality axiom 5].
Remark The proof of Henkin's completeness theorem above is slightly simpler than the usual one 24, 6] .
First, we do not need to re-do the work of G odel's completeness theorem, but we use this theorem instead. Then, the fact that every equality model of the extensionality axiom can be turned into an equality functional model is a lemma here and its proof is usually mixed with the proof of the completeness theorem.
Remark In Henkin's de nition 24], the condition that a general model needs to be closed by explicit denitions is stated as the fact that every -term has a denotation. This condition is a quite strong requirement 27] as the notion of general model is dependent of the considered language which is undesirable. Instead of taking a presentation of type theory based on -calculus we can take one based on the comprehension schemes. Then this condition can be rephrased as the fact that the model is a model of the comprehension schemes 32, 13, 7, 15] . This condition is still dependent of the language as an axiom scheme is a set of axiom indexed by expressions of the language. But now, the same critic to Henkin's models holds for models of (for instance) Peano's arithmetic, as this theory is also expressed using an axiom scheme, and thus a model of this theory cannot be de ned independently of the language. Another equivalent condition stated in 4, 5] Inria using the fact that, for each type, the comprehension schemes are equivalent to a nite number of their instances. This condition is independent of the language.
Remark In Henkin's de nition 24], the fact that the elements of M T !U are functions from M T to M U is part of the de nition of the notion of model. Thus the extensionality axiom is in some sense built in the de nition of models. The idea of taking arbitrary elements in M T !U (and thus functions for A T;U that are not mere function application) comes from 15, 19] . Also the fact that M o has two elements is part of this de nition and thus the axiom 8x 8y ("(x) , "(y)) ) (x = y) is also built in this de nition.
Thus, the usual de nition of models mixes up two di erent questions: (1) Remark For a presentation of type theory based on the skolemized comprehension schemes (combinators), we have the same de nition as for the presentation with the non-skolemized comprehensions schemes, but we need to take in the de nition of the model a denotation for each Skolem's symbol and the condition that the model must be a model of the skolemized comprehension schemes instead of the non-skolemized ones. General models can be de ned as above.
For a presentation of type theory based on -calculus, we can use the translation of the theory based on -calculus to the one based on the skolemized comprehension schemes 14] and de ne the denotation of a term as the denotation of its translation. Then have the equivalence: P is provable in the theory based on -calculus if and only if P 0 , the translation of P, is provable in the theory based on the skolemized comprehension schemes, if and only if P 0 is valid in every model of type theory, if and only if P is valid in every model of type theory.
In a general model, the denotation of -terms and propositions can be de ned directly by Remark The notion of model of a higher order language can be used also to study stronger theories (with the descriptions axiom, the axiom of choice, the axiom of in nity, axioms of higher order arithmetic, etc.) and weaker theories (dropping extensionality, multiple truth values, etc.). For instance to show the independence of the extensionality axiom in type theory, Andrews 5] This result is however slightly di erent from the one of 5] as we show here the independence of the extensionality axiom from a presentation of type theory with comprehension schemes while the result of 5] shows the independence of the extensionality axiom from type theory with an explicit notation for functions based on -calculus, and the equivalence of the two formulations of type theory seems to require the extensionality axiom 14].
Higher-order skolemization (Miller's theorem)
In rst order logic, Skolem's theorem expresses the fact that if we replace in a theory an axiom of the form 8x 1 ::: 8x n 9y P by the proposition 8x 1 ::: 8x n P y (f x 1 ::: x n )] where f is a new function symbol, i.e. a function symbol that does not occur in the theory, we get a conservative extension of the theory, i.e. the propositions with no occurrence of f are provable in one theory if and only if they are provable in the other.
If we try to generalize this theorem to type theory, letting f be a primitive symbol of type T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! U, where T i is the type of x i and U the type of y, then the theorem is false. Indeed, the axiom of choice is not provable in type theory 4], but its skolemized form is.
In 36, 37] Miller proposes a Skolem-like theorem for type theory: the symbol f is a Skolem's symbol of arity n. Whenever a Skolem's symbol f of arity n occurs in a term it must occur in a subterm of the form (f a 1 ::: a n ) and the free variables of the a i 's cannot be bound higher in the term. In a presentation of type theory, based on combinators, there are no bound variables and thus Miller's condition simpli es to the fact that f of arity n must occur only in subterms of the form (f a 1 ::: a n ).
Inria
In the rst order presentation of type theory with combinators (obtained by skolemizing the comprehension schemes 14]) we can deduce this result from Skolem's theorem. Indeed, if we skolemize an axiom 8x 1 ::: 8x n 9y P we introduce a function symbol f of rank (T 1 ; :::; T n ; U), and not a primitive symbol of type T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! U. Thus the symbol f alone is not a term, but it must be applied to some terms a 1 ; :::; a n to give a term.
3 Type theory as an untyped rst order theory
Coding typed rst order theories into untyped ones
Let us consider a typed rst order language. We construct an ordinary rst order language as follows 20, 15] :
to each function symbol f we associate a function symbol f 0 with the same arity, to each predicate symbol P we associate a predicate symbol P 0 with the same arity, to each type T we associate a unary predicate symbol T T .
We translate terms and propositions as follows. We translate a theory by translating each axiom, and adding the following axioms.
9x (T T x) 8x 1 ::: 8x n (((T T1 x 1 )^:::^(T Tn x n )) ) (T Tn+1 (f 0 x 1 ::: x n ))) if f is a function symbol of rank (T 1 ; :::; T n ; T n+1 ).
Proposition Let ? be a typed rst order theory and ? 0 its translation (i.e. the translation of its axioms plus 8P 8Q ((T o P)^(T o Q)) ) ((" P) , (" Q)) ) (P = o Q) 8f 8g ((T T !U f)^(T T !U g)) ) (8x (T T x) ) ( T;U f x) = U ( T;U g x)) ) (f = T !U g) Equality: 8x (T T x) ) (x = T x) 8x 1 ::: 8x n 8a 8b (("(T U1 x 1 ))^:::^("(T Un x n ))^(T T a)^(T T b)) ) (a = T b) ) ( Remark The axiom 9x (T T x) is subsumed by the comprehension schemes and the non emptyness axiom for the type .
Remark We have seen that there are two ways to restrict na ve set theory to avoid Russell's paradox. Either we restrict the formation of propositions from objects (type theory) or we restrict the formation of objects from propositions (set theory). When we translate type theory into an untyped setting we shift from one restriction to the other, indeed the formation of proposition is not restricted anymore, but the relativization of quanti er restricts the comprehension schemes. Relativization of quanti ers shows that, as already remarked in 42, 18] , the two ways to avoid Russell's paradox: restricting the formation of propositions from objects (as in type theory) and restricting the formation of objects from propositions (as in set theory) lead to a somehow similar result.
A single symbol for application
From the theory above, we remove the symbols T;U and we add a symbol . We then de ne the translation from a theory to the other, by replacing every T;U by . Inria 
Adding equality
We add a symbol = and we take as axioms the universal closure of the following propositions.
8x (x = x) 8a 8b (a = b) ) (P x a] ) P x b]) 8x 8y (((T T x)^(T T y)) ) (x = T y) , (x = y)) Remark The symbol = T is an individual symbol, while = is a predicate symbol.
Extending predicates
If a is a predicate of type T ! o and b an object that is not in T, then the proposition (" ( a b)) is not well-formed in the typed rst order presentation of type theory. Now this proposition is well-formed, but we cannot prove it nor its negation. Is is convenient to add an axiom expressing that such a proposition is false, i.e. if a has type T ! o then it does not contain objects out of T. In other words, atomic meaningless propositions are considered as false 42].
Remark Notice that when we say that an object is in T ! U we say that when we apply it to an object in T, we get an object in U. With the axiom above we say a little more, if an object is in T ! o, when we apply it to an object in T we get an object in o, but also when we apply it to an object not in T we get an object which is not the positive truth value of o.
Types as sets
To the theory above, we add the individual symbols I, O and a function symbol ! and the axiom 8a 8b 8f 8x ((" ( (a ! b) f))^(" ( a x))) ) (" ( b (f x))) To each type T we associate a term T 0 de ned by 0 = I, o 0 = O, (T ! U) 0 = T 0 ! U 0 . From now on, a type is a term in the image of the translation 0 , i.e. a closed term in the sublanguage I; O; !. We remove the symbols T T and we replace every proposition (T T a) by (" ( T 0 a)). We then get the following axioms.
Comprehension:
9A (" ( (T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! O) A)) 8x 1 ::: 8x n (" ( T 1 x 1 ))^:::^(" ( T n x n )) ) (" ( ::: ( A x 1 ) ::: x n )) , P 9f (" ( (T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! U) f))^8x 1 ::: 8x n ((" ( T 1 x 1 ))^:::^(" ( T n x n ))) ) ( ::: ( f x 1 ) ::: x n )) = t Extensionality:
8x (x = x) 8a 8b (a = b) ) (P x a] ) P x b]) 8x 8y ((" ( T x))^(" ( T y))) ) (x = T y) , (x = y) Function space:
Non empty:
Remark The typing axiom 8x 8y ((" ( (T ! U) x))^(" ( T y))) ) (" ( U ( x y)))
is subsumed by the function space axioms.
In a relaxed notation, we write (a b) for the term ( a b). The axioms are rephrased as follows.
Comprehension:
9A (" (T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! O) A)^8x 1 ::: 8x n ((" (T 1 x 1 ))^:::^(" (T n x n ) ) (" (A x 1 ::: x n )) , P 9f (" (T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! U) f)^8x 1 ::: 8x n ((" (T 1 x 1 ))^:::^(" (T n x n ))) ) (f x 1 ::: x n ) = t Extensionality:
8x (x = x) 8a 8b (a = b) ) (P x a] ) P x b]) 8x 8y ((" (T x))^(" (T y))) ) (x = T y) , (x = y) Function space:
Remark The comprehension schemes are indexed by propositions and terms. We have seen above how to avoid this dependence by using the combinators K and S. Many axioms are schemes indexed by types. This dependence can also be avoided by introducing a new predicate symbol Type and axioms Type(I) Type(O) 8x 8y (T ype(x)^Type(y)) ) Type(x ! y) and by replacing the type scheme variables by ordinary variables quanti ed in Type. For instance, the Second extensionality axiom would be rephrased
This way, type theory can be formalized with a nite number of axioms. Inria 
Conservative extension
De nition Let P be a proposition in the language of type theory as a typed rst order theory. We write Thus the propositions of ( ) are valid in this model. So are the comprehension schemes and extensionality axioms. Then the equality axioms and function space axioms are also valid in this model, thus all the propositions of ? 0 ( ) are valid.
Conversely, consider a model M of ? 0 ( ), without loss of generality we can consider that this model is an equality model, i.e. that = denotes equality.
We construct a model of ? . We de ne M T as the subset of M of the elements a such that "( (T; a)) = 1. The denotation of T;U is the restriction of the denotation of to M T !U M T , by the function space axioms the codomain of this function is in M U . The denotation of " is the restriction of the denotation of " to M o . The denotation of = T is the element of M T !T!o mapping a and b to y if a = b and to the other element of M o otherwise (such an object exists because the model is an equality model and a model of the proposition 8x 8y ((" ( T x))^(" ( T y))) ) (x = T y) , (x = y)). Now, the denotation of a proposition P in this model is the denotation of (P ) in the model M. Corollary Let ? be the axioms of type theory as a typed rst order theory and ? 0 of type theory above. Let be a set of propositions and P be a proposition, we have ? `P if and only if ? 0 ( )` (P ). Remark We can prove the consistency of type theory by building a model as follows. We take M being any non empty set (in nite, if we consider an axiom of in nity), say the set of natural numbers, M o = f0; 1g and M T !U as the set of all functions from M T to M U . Then we interpret equality as equality in the model.
From this model we can build a model for the theory above by considering M = U M T ] f?g.
Then we can wonder in which language this consistency proof can be formalized. To form the union (disjoint or not) of the collection of the M T we need the union axiom and this collection to be a set. Thus, it seems that we require the replacement axiom to form such a set. Even with the replacement axiom, we need the existence of a functional relation P(X; Y ) which is true is and only if X = T and Y = M T for some T. The possibility to construct this model of type theory in Zermelo's set theory or in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is not that obvious. We can prove the consistency of type theory in Zermelo's set theory, using the compactness theorem and the fact any nite set of propositions uses only a nite number of types. This way we can build a model for any nite set of propositions as a nite union of some (M T ) T ( nite unions exists in Zermelo's set theory because we have the pairing axiom) 33, 30] . But, this method does not seem to generalize to the formulation of type theory where types are sets, as we cannot interpret the symbol ! in a nite union of M T 's.
In contrast, the model above can be easily be built in Zermelo's set theory plus the axiom \there exists a model of Zermelo's set theory" as a subset of the model of set theory (relative consistency).
Remark It is well-know that cut-elimination for type theory is much more di cult than cut-elimination for rst order logic. This is not contradictory with the possibility to express type theory as a rst order theory. Indeed, the cut-elimination theorem for bare rst order logic does not imply the cut elimination theorem for all the rst order theories. For instance, in arithmetic we have more cuts than in bare rst order logic. An open problem is to de ne a notion of cut for type theory as a rst order language, that corresponds to the notion of cut in the usual formulation of type theory and to adapt the proofs of cut elimination 45, 41] and normalization 21, 22].
An extension
In the formulation above, in the comprehension schemes t and P need to be translations of propositions and terms of the typed presentation. We can extend these axioms in such a way that P is any proposition and t any term. However, we need to restrict the functional comprehension scheme.
9A (" (T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! O) A)^8x 1 ::: 8x n ((" (T 1 x 1 ))^:::^(" (T n x n ))) ) ((" (A x 1 ::: x n )) , P)) 9f (" (T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! U) f)^8x 1 ::: 8x n (((" (T 1 x 1 ))^:::^(" (T n x n ))^(" (U t))) ) (f x 1 ::: x n ) = t) This theory is consistent, as one can build a model for it from a standard model of type theory, i.e. a general model such that the set M T !U is the set of all functions from M T to M U . But we leave open the problem of determining if it is an extension of the theory above, or if theorems are the same in both theories.
An explicit notation for sets and functions
Now consider the skolemization of the comprehension schemes. For each proposition P, sequence of variables x 1 ; :::; x n and sequence of types T 1 ; :::; T n we introduce an object f(x 1 ; T 1 ); :::; (x n ; T n ) j Pg and for each term t sequences of variables x 1 ; :::; x n and types T 1 ; :::; T n and type U we introduce an object (x 1 ; T 1 ); :::; (x n ; T n ); U 7 ! t. The comprehension schemes are rephrased (" ((T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! O) f(x 1 ; T 1 ); :::; (x n ; T n ) j Pg)) 8x 1 ::: 8x n ((" (T 1 x 1 )^:::^(" (T n x n ) ) (" (f(x 1 ; T 1 ); :::; (x n ; T n ) j Pg x 1 ::: x n )) , P (" ((T 1 ! ::: ! T n ! U) ((x 1 ; T 1 ); :::; (x n ; T n ); U 7 ! t))) 8x 1 ::: 8x n ((" (T 1 x 1 ))^:::^(" (T n x n ))^(" (U t))) ) (((x 1 ; T 1 ); :::; (x n ; T n ); U 7 ! t) x 1 ::: x n ) = t
In this presentation we have an explicit notation for objects, but this notation is closer to a language of combinators than to -calculus 14].
Inria
Remark In this language, we can drop the symbols = T because we have f(x 1 ; T); (x 2 ; T) j x 1 = x 2 g. Remark (Decidability of typing propositions)
Consider a closed term a in this language, there exists at most one type T such that (" (T a)) is provable and this type can be computed from a. This also holds if a has free variables, provided that we have a unique axiom (" (T x x)) for every variable x free in a.
Remark (Turning the skolemized comprehension schemes into a rewrite rule) In Church's type theory, -equivalent propositions are provably equivalent. Thus we can identifyequivalent propositions and drop the conversion axioms. This way, we erase the conversion steps from proofs. As -equivalence is decidable, proof judgements are still decidable.
We want to do the same thing in this presentation of type theory. Let a 1 ; :::; a n be terms, from the axiom 8x 1 ::: 8x n ((" (T 1 x 1 ))^:::^(" (T n x n ))^(" (U t))) ) (((x 1 ; T 1 ); :::; (x n ; T n ); U 7 ! t) x 1 ::: x n ) = t we get ((" (T 1 a 1 ))^:::^(" (T n a n ))^(" (U t x 1 a 1 ; :::; x n a n ]))) ) (((x 1 ; T 1 ); :::; (x n ; T n ); U 7 ! t) a 1 ::: a n ) = t x 1 a 1 ; :::; x n a n ]
Thus, in this presentation, the conversion schemes (skolemized comprehension schemes) is guarded by typing conditions. As these predicates are decidable, -equivalence is still decidable, but reduction requires dynamic type checking, i.e. type checking of expressions before each reduction step. This dynamic type checking is a drawback of too liberal languages where the formation of propositions is not restricted.
Remark We have seen that to restrict na ve set theory, we can either restrict the formation of propositions from objects (using typed languages) or the formation of objects from propositions (by restricting the comprehension schemes). Here we do not restrict the syntax of propositions neither the one of objects, but we restrict the uses of objects (i.e. the skolemized comprehension schemes) as to reduce ((x; T); U 7 ! t) u to t x u] we need to prove that u belongs to T and t x u] belongs to U.
3.7 Relations between type theory and set theory 3.7.1 A weak set theory Extensionality axiom From the extensionality axioms we get 8a 8b
From which we can deduce 8a 8b ((" (T ! O) a)^(" (T ! O) b)) ) (8x ((" (a x)) , (" (b x))) ) (a = b)) If we write (" (x y)) as y 2 x then the theorem above is rewritten 8a 8b ((a 2 (
This extensionality axiom is weaker than the usual one in set theory. As to prove the equality of two objects we must prove that they have the same elements, but also that they are sets and sets in the same type.
Thus this axiom allows to have non-sets elements (the so-called urelements), as the elements of I for instance and it allows several empty sets (one in each type). A similar restriction of the extensionality axiom is considered in 38]. However, the axiom of 38] allows non-sets elements but only one empty set.
Subset scheme Consider a proposition P and call x, y 1 ; :::; y n its free variables. Let a be a variable. By the comprehension scheme we have 9b ((" ((U 1 ! ::: ! U n ! (T ! O) ! T ! O) b))^8y 1 ::: 8y n 8a 8x (((" (U 1 y 1 ))^:::^(" (U n y n ))^(" ((T ! O) a))^(" (T x))) ) ((" (b y 1 ::: y n a x)) , ((" (a x))^P))))
From which we can derive 8y 1 ::: 8y n 8a (((" (U 1 y 1 ))^:::^(" (U n y n ))^(" ((T ! O) a))) ) 9c 8x ((" (c x)) , (" (a x))^P))) If we write (" (x y)) as y 2 x then the theorem above is rewritten 8y 1 ::: 8y n 8a ((y 1 2 U 1 )^:::^(y n 2 U n )^(a 2 (T ! O))) ) 9c 8x ((x 2 c) , ((x 2 a)^P)) which is the subset scheme of set theory, the only di erence is that we have a guard a 2 (T ! O) that expresses that a needs to be a set and the guards y i 2 U i that express that y i must belong to some set. Remark The set a carries the type T of the elements of b. Indeed, the comprehension scheme of type theory gives the equivalence (" (b y 1 ::: y n a x)) , ((" (a x))^P) only for x in T. We can drop this hypothesis because if x is not in T then both (" (b y 1 ::: y n a x)) and (a x) are false. In absence of a set a, we have to keep this hypothesis and we get the equivalence (" (b y 1 ::: y n x)) , ((" (T x))^P).
Power set axiom By the comprehension scheme we have
, (8y (" (T y)) ) (" (x y) ) (" (a y))))
As above we deduce
) (" (a y))))) Again, if we write (" (x y)) as y 2 x we get 8a (a 2 (T ! O)) ) 9b 8x (x 2 b) , ((x 2 (T ! O))^(8y (y 2 x) ) (y 2 a)))
Which is the power set axiom. We have the same guard as above. Moreover we have an extra condition x 2 (T ! O). Notice that the theorem is false without this condition because the power set of a does not contain the empty sets of types di erent from T ! O.
Union axiom By the comprehension scheme we have
, 9y (" (y x))^(" (a y))) Again, if we write (" (x y)) as y 2 x we get 8a (a 2 ((T ! O) ! O)) ) 9b 8x (x 2 b) , 9y ((x 2 y)^(y 2 a))
Which is the union axiom with the same guard as above.
Pairing axiom By the comprehension scheme we have
As above we deduce 8a 8a 0 ((" (T a))^(" (T a 0 ))) ) 9b (8x (" (b x)) , ((x = a)^(x = a 0 ))) Again, if we write (" (x y)) as y 2 x we get 8a 8a 0 ((a 2 T)^(a 0 2 T)) ) 9b (8x (x 2 b) , ((x = a)^(x = a 0 )))
Here the guard is very strong, to form the pair of two elements we need them to be in the same type. It is fairer to say that the pairing axiom is false this theory.
To allow a more liberal pairing axiom, we would need to include type cumulativity 11] and we would get a theory very close to set theory 42, 23].
A comparison
Both type theory and set theory, consider a universe that contains a set of primitive elements (I in type theory and f;g in set theory) and is closed by two operations: taking the power set of some set and taking a subset of some set de ned by a property expressed in the language. In set theory, these operations are expressed by the power set axiom and the subset scheme. Type theory exploits the fact that the power set of a subset of A is a subset of the power set of A and thus all the power set operations can be performed before all the subset operations. The power set operation is expressed by the types construction rules and the subset operation by the comprehension scheme. To both theory we can add an axiom of in nity, expressing that there is an in nite set.
In this universe the union axiom is admissible, i.e. by induction over the structure of the construction of A, if A is a set of sets, all the elements of the elements of A belong to some set B, thus the union of the elements of A can be build as a subset of B. Then, these theories must give tools for relations (i.e. n-ary predicates). In type theory, we extend the comprehensions scheme to n-ary predicates. In set theory we add an axiom allowing the formation of pairs. Then ordered pairs are formed by the Haussdorf-Wiener-Kuratowski de nition < a; b >= ffag; fa; bgg. A n-uple < a 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a n?1 ; a n > is then de ned as < a 1 ; < a 2 ; :::; < a n?1 ; a n > ::: >> and a n-ary relation is a predicate over n-uples.
Then we need to form functions. In set theory functions are relations. In type theory, we extend the comprehension scheme for functional types and we add a descriptions axiom to relate functional relations and functions 6].
At last, we need to form natural numbers, none of the theories can de ne n as the set of sets of n elements. Both theory can use the in nite set to construct nite cardinals as the set of sets of n elements of this set (see for instance 6] for an example in type theory and 1] for one in set theory). But, using the pairing axiom, set theory can also give Von Neumann's de nition of ordinals, i.e. take for the number n a the set of n elements f0; :::; n ? 1g.
Pairing in set theory
The pairing axiom in set theory is then used to build ordered pairs (and thus relations), nite unions and ordinals. But the cost is that this axiom permits to form heterogeneous sets such as f0; f0gg. Notice that this axiom is the only one responsible for heterogeneous sets in set theory: if we drop it we can associate a type to all the objects that we can form in set theory. Dropping this axiom is advocated, for instance, in 9]. Taking n-ary predicates and functions as primitive and de ning natural numbers as cardinals permits to drop this axiom. In some cases, we might want to take cartesian products and disjoint unions as primitive constructions too (cartesian products and disjoint unions are built using the pairing axiom in set theory).
But we leave open the problem of giving a de nition for trans nite numbers in this setting. 4 An extension of type theory with subtyping
We consider, at last, an extension of type theory, where the axioms are not restricted by types, but by any set. The axioms are rephrased as follows. Comprehension: 8a 1 ::: 8a n 8a 0 1 ::: 8a 0 n ((" ((a 0 1 ! O) a 1 ))^:::^(" ((a 0 n ! O) a n ))) ) 9A (" (a 1 ! ::: ! a n ! O) A)^8x 1 ::: 8x n ((" (a 1 x 1 ))^:::^(" (a n x n ))) ) ((" (A x 1 ::: x n )) , P)) 8a 1 ::: 8a n 8b 8a 0 1 ::: 8a 0 n 8b 0 8c ((" ((a 0 1 ! O) a 1 ))^:::^(" ((a 0 n ! O) a n ))^(" ((b 0 ! O) b))^(" (b c))) ) 9f (" (a 1 ! ::: ! a n ! b) f)^8x 1 ::: 8x n (( (" (a 1 x 1 ) )^:::^(" (a n x n ))^(" (b t))) ) (f x 1 ::: x n ) = t) Extensionality:
Proposition This theory is consistent.
Proof We construct a model as follows. Take M I be any non empty set (in nite if we consider also an axiom of in nity). Take We then check now that the axioms are valid in this model.
Comprehension. If the denotation of some a i is not in some M Ti!O then (" ((a 0 i ! O) a i )) is false. Otherwise, we take for A the function mapping e 1 ; :::; e n to 1 if for every i, a i (e i ) = 1 and P is veri ed by e 1 ; :::; e n , to 0 if for every i, a i (e i ) = 1 and P is not veri ed by e 1 ; :::; e n and to ? O otherwise. This function is an element of a 1 ! ::: ! a n ! O. In the same way, either the denotation of some a i is not in some M Ti!O , the denotation of b is not in some M U !O or the denotation of b in an \empty set", i.e. a function in M U !O never taking the value 1 and the condition is always false, or f can be built as an element of a 1 ! ::: ! a n ! b.
Extensionality. The rst extensionality axiom is obviously valid. For the second, either a is not in some M T !O or b is not in some M U !O then the conditions are false. Otherwise the two functions co ncide on a and they are both equal to ? U out of a. Thus they are equal.
The equality axioms, the function space axioms and the non emptyness axiom are obviously valid.
Remark Again, the formation of this model is not obvious in Zermelo's of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, but it is simple in the set theory extended with an axiom \set theory is consistent".
Remark This formulation of type theory is typeless, as every set is a type. Remark Even if even is a subset of nat the empty set of even numbers and the empty set of natural numbers are distinct. The proposition :(; nat = ; even ) is valid in the model above. Both (; nat 3) and (; even 3) are false, but the rst is merely false and the second is false because it is meaningless.
In a syntactically restricted language, only the rst proposition would be allowed.
Remark The language obtained by skolemizing these axiom, we have a term f = (x; nat); even 7 ! 2 x, where even is the predicate f(n; nat) j 9p (" (nat p))^(n = 2 p)g. This language handles subtyping as we can de ne the term g = (x; even); even 7 ! f(x). The function f and g are di erent, for instance in the model above the proposition :(f = g) is valid. In this setting, the types ordering is mere inclusion.
Ordinary subtyping can be recovered as some subset of this language, for instance to a limited collection of sets, where inclusion is decidable.
Remark The usual methodology in typed -calculus to introduce a new concept is to de ne a language for types and terms and then a model of this language in ordinary mathematics (set theory). It seems that we use a di erent method here by giving a de nition in ordinary mathematics of the new concept. In fact it is well known that the two methods are almost the same. For instance, it is the same to de ne a group as a model of group theory or as a set with an internal binary function, that is associative, has a neutral element and such that every element has an inverse.
Conclusion
We have given a new formulation of type theory. Along the way we have given a modular proof of Henkin's completeness theorem, by reducing it to G odel's completeness theorem for rst order logic and a new proof of Miller's theorem for a combinators based type theory, by reducing it to Skolem's theorem for rst order logic.
The formulation of type theory we have obtained is a rst order theory. Types are mere sets, thus it eliminates one of the conceptual di culties of type theory: explaining both the notion of type and the notion of set. In the formulation of the theory with a predicates for types, typical ambiguity is not required: group theory, for instance, can be developed in an arbitrary set of an arbitrary type.
The skolemized form of this theory gives a language for sets and functions based on combinators. Functions are primitive and propositions are objects.
Meaningless statements are not yet forbidden in this formulation (thus this formulation may be not as good as the usual one for automated theorem proving 6], and reduction on this language requires dynamic type checking). If we want to forbid such statements, while keeping types as sets, we can use neither rst order logic nor typed rst order logic. We need to develop a variant of rst order logic where the wellformedness and truth of propositions are mutually dependent. In such a language, we need for instance, to prove that n is a natural number to form the proposition even(n)). Such a language, like natural languages, would provide three di erent notions: syntactical correctness, meaningfulness and truth, while rst order languages (untyped or typed) provide only syntactical correctness and truth. Such a language may be a good alternative to subtyping. At last it should be possible to express in an extension of this theory, the Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of intuitionistic proofs as functional objects. Propositions would be represented by sets of proofs instead of types of proofs and the decidability of proof judgements would be a consequence of the decidability of a fragment of the language, instead of the decidability of typing judgements. Although the truth of propositions and the truth of proof judgements are two distinct notions 35], propositions and proof judgements can be expressed in a single universal language, this language having two distinct semantics.
